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NOTES
PARTICIPATION OF PREFERRED SHAREHOLDERS
BEYOND STATED PREFERENCE
In the absence of express provision, may preferred shareholders participate
in dividends beyond the stated preference? In the recent case of Tenant v. Ep-
stein," the Supreme Court of Illinois was called upon to answer this question
under rather unusual circumstances. The corporation was organized with
capital stock of $i6o,ooo, consisting of 2000 shares of $5 par value common
stock, and 30,000 shares of $5 pax value 7% cumulative preferred. Tenant
owned 500 shares of common and 2000 shares of preferred stock, while the Ep-
steins2 had 1500 shares of common and 28,000 shares of preferred stock. Both
common and preferred carried one vote per share. Cash dividends of 7% on
the preferred stock had been paid annually during the seven year period of the
z 356 Ill. 26, I89 N.E. 864 (1934), noted in 83 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 91 (1934).
2 The Epstein family were directors of the corporation and owned all stock except that
owned by Tenant.
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corporation's existence. At the end of this period, no dividends having been de-
clared on the common stock, an "equalizing"3 dividend of 49% was paid on the
common. Subsequently a stock dividend was declared of one share of $5 par
value common stock for each share of outstanding stock, common and pre-
ferred.4 In connection with the stock dividend $16o,ooo of the accumulated
surplus was capitalized. A cash dividend was thereafter declared on all common
stock.
Tenant objected to the sharing of the preferred in the stock dividend and the
subsequent cash dividend asserting that the surplus belonged only to the com-
mon shareholders either as dividends or as surplus on liquidation. He contended
that since the articles of incorporation contained no express provision allowing
the preferred to participates and the certificates of stock expressly limited the
preferred to the 7% preference,6 the preferred stockholders had no right to share
in this dividend, which was admittedly in excess of the 7% preference. The Ep-
steins sought to justify the action of the corporation on the following grounds:
(i) Since the articles of incorporation did not expressly limit the preferred to the
stated preference, preferred shareholders should participate equally with the
common in all dividends.7 (2) To protect the preferred shareholders' propor-
tionate interest on the assets of the corporation on dissolution' they should be
permitted to participate in stock dividends. (3) Likewise, to protect the pre-
ferred shareholders proportionate voting strength, they should share in all stock
dividends.
3 This was called "equalizing" because the total dividends paid on the preferred stock before
that time had been 49%. It was the theory of the Epsteins that this 49% to the common would
put both classes of stock in a position to share in a stock dividend.
4 Tenant received 2500 shares, making his holding 3000 shares of common and 2000 shares
of preferred stock. The Epsteins received 29,500 shares so they then held 31,000 shares of
common and 28,000 shares of preferred stock.
-The articles of incorporation provided: "The preferred stock shall be seven per cent (7%)
cumulative dividend preferred, and shall be a first lien on the assets of the company in event of
dissolution, over the common stock of the company, and shall be entitled to payment of seven
per cent (7%) cumulative dividend annually before any dividend shall be declared and paid
upon the common stock of the company." 356 Ifl. at 30.
6 The certificates were similar to the articles except that they included the provision, "The
holders of the capital preferred stock shall receive from the surplus or net earnings of the cor-
portation dividends at the rate of seven per cent (7%) per annum at the par value of such
stock, and no more, payable quarterly." (Italics supplied.) 356 Ill. at 31.
7 See the article and certificate provision, supra notes 5, 6. The Epsteins relied entirely on
the articles and contended that the certificate provision "and no more" should not be con-
sidered because such was antagonistic to the articles of incorporation.
8 The contention was that even though the court decided the preferred was limited to its
preference as a going concern, it was not so limited on liquidation, but rather was participating.
Since a stock dividend merely redistributes the units of corporate ownership, the preferred
necessarily had to share in the stock dividend to maintain its pro rata ownership in the com-
pany.
NOTES
The Supreme Court held that the rights of the preferred shareholders were
limited to the stated preference and the stock dividend was set aside.9
As to whether a stated preference limits the right of preferred shareholders to
participate in current o dividends, the authorities do not agree." Early text
writers 2 and a series of Pennsylvania cases 3 take the view that, in the absence
of express provision, preferred shareholders may participate in current divi-
dends. Such a view is predicated upon the premise that all stock is basically
equal; preferences add to the rights of certain shares but subtract none of the
already existing rights. Thus a 7% preference would entitle the preferred share-
holders to receive a 7% dividend first, but once the common shareholders had
received a like amount, further dividends in the same period would be shared
equally. The right to participate could of course be expressly denied.X4
The contrary and majority view's has been accepted in Maryland, 6 Maine, 7
Ohio,'" a federal court, 9 and England. 20 In support of this view it is said that
preferred shareholders should have only those rights that common understand-
9356 IM. 26, 189 N.E. 864 (1934).
xo By current dividends is meant the dividends declared in the going concern. From a stand-
point of decreasing surplus, stock or cash dividends could be considered current.
"1 See Thompson, The Respective Rights of Preferred and Common Stockholders in Surplus
Profits, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1921) for an analysis of the conflicting views.
6 Fletcher, Corporations (ist ed. i919), 6o3o ff., § 3634. Conyngton, Corporate Organiza-
tion and Management (I917), 84, "Unless expressly provided, preferred stock participates
equally with the common after both common and preferred have received an equal dividend."
i Cook, Corporations (4th ed. 1898), § 269, "It seems that unless the corporate contract ex-
pressly provides otherwise, preferred stockholders participate in surplus profits remaining after
the proper dividend has been declared, on the preferred and an equal dividend on the com-
mon." But see note I5 infra.
'3 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 215 Pa. 61o, 64 Atl. 829 (I9O6); Sternbergh v.
Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Ati. 166 (i9o9); Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, IO4 At]. 614 (1918).
'4 The Appellate Court in Tenant v. Epstein did in fact conclude that the phrase "and no
more" in the certificates expressly negatived equal participation as to cash dividends, but the
Supreme Court held that the articles of incorporation alone would have limited the preference,
"It was not necessary in the stock certificates to use the words 'and no more' to limit the pay-
ment to 7 per cent per annum." 356 Ill. at 38.
Is 12 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations (perm. ed. 1933), § 5448. The author
recognizes both views but seems to favor the majority; i Cook, Corporations (8th ed. 1923),
§ 269; Thompson, supra note 11, 483 ff. (1921); ii Corn. L. Quar. 234 (1925); 79 Univ. Pa.
L. Rev. 466 (1931); 20 Ill. L. Rev. 288 (1925). But see Christ, Rights of Holders of Preferred
Stock, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 731 (1929).
16 Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 93 Md. 475, 49 At]. 327 (I9OI); Powers Foundry Co.
v. Miller, 171 At]. 842 (Md. 1934).
17 Stone v. U.S. Envelope Co., 119 Me. 394, 1zi At]. 536 (1920).
18 Sbiminon v. Screw & Tack Co., z8 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 569 (z916); Duwelius v. Champion
Fibre Paper Co., 25 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 107 (1924), affd. in 22 Ohio L. Rep. 600.
19 Niles v. Ludlow Valve Co., 202 Fed. 41 (C.C.A. 2d 1913).
20 Will v. United Lankat Plantations Co., Ltd., [1912] 2 Ch. 57i.
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ing and business usage give them, that ...... the phrase 'preferred stock' holds
out to the ear of the ordinary investor no promise of participation in earnings
beyond his preferential dividends.112"
But granting that the majority view22 as to cash dividends is the preferable
and hence that the stated preference limits participation, stock dividends in-
volve additional problems. For a stock dividend by increasing the number of
units of ownership's decreases the proportionate interest each share would carry
in the assets of the corporation in the event of dissolution .4 Thus it may be
argued that any shareholder whose rights in dissolution are not limited should
also share in the stock dividend in order to maintain his proportionate interest.2S
But since a stated preference as to dividends is held to limit the right to divi-
dends, a stated preference on dissolution should be held to limit the participa-
tion at dissolution to the amount of the preference. A class of stock limited as
to current dividends but carrying unlimited rights to participate in surplus on
dissolution is an anomaly giving rise to a number of almost insoluble problems.21
As held in Tenant v. Epstein, charter provisions should not be construed to con-
template this combination of rights unless the language clearly so requires. 7
But even in a case where the preferred shareholders have unlimited participa-
tion at dissolution, while that fact may make improper the distribution of a
stock dividend among holders of common stock alone, it does not necessarily
follow that the preferred shareholders may share in a stock dividend, for such
2" Stone v. U.S. Envelope Co., ri9 Me. 394, 398, ii AtI. 536 (1920). The court in Tenant v.
Epstein adheres to this view completely, "we think the results reached .... are more nearly in
accord with business usage and the expectations of investors when they purchase preferred
shares of stock." 356 Ill. at 35.
-Supra notes 16, 17, i8, 19, 20.
'3 Gibbons v. Mahon, 613 U.S. 549 (i8go); Graves v. Graves, 94 N.J. Eq. 268, i2o At. 420
(1923). Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (i918), i88, 215. The author compares a stock
dividend to the process of changing a $5 bill into "ones." The total value is the same before
and after.
'4 This argument is frequently advanced when a new issue of stock is declared for the pur-
pose of raising funds. The courts hold that the existing stockholders have a "pre-emptive"
right to subscribe for the new shares before it is offered to the public in order to protect their
proportionate interest in the dividends and assets of the corporation and their voting power.
Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1o9o (i9o6); Jones v. Concord &
M. R. R., 67 N.H. r19, 38 Ati. 120 (1892).
s This was the argument on which the Appellate Court based its decision, 271 Ill. App. 204
(1933). See also Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Thomas Branch & Co., 147 Va.
509, 137 S.E. 620 (1927).
'6See Continental Ins. Co. v. U.S. Reading Co., 259 U.S. i36 (1922).
" If the participation of certain stock was different in current dividends and final dissolu-
tion, the stock in control would either declare all the surplus out as current dividends or save it
until final distribution, according to its own participation rights. This should clearly be
avoided in absence of express provision to the contrary.
NOTES
sharing would really give the preferred shareholders more than the 7% current
dividends to which they are limited.
2
1
Since each share of common and preferred stock in Tenant v. Epstein. carried
one vote,2 9 the relative voting strength of the common and preferred would be
fixed by the number of shares of the two types. In support of the claim of the
preferred shareholders to participate in the stock dividend it was urged that if
they did not, their proportionate voting strength would be lessened.3o But un-
less the limitation on the preferred dividend rights is to be overridden,3' the pre-
ferred shareholders' right to maintain their proportionate voting strength
would only be a reason for denying a stock dividend to the common shareholders
alone.32
Thus, regard for preferred voting rights and participation rights on dissolu-
tion (if such exist) may make improper any stock dividend on common stock
alone, while regard for dividend limitations may forbid the issuance of a stock
dividend to the preferred shareholders. Unless complicated solutions33 are re-
sorted to, the result is that the corporation may be prevented from declaring
any stock dividend. And that result seems justified when the relatively small
utility of the stock dividend practice is weighed against the injury which is
bound to occur to certain shareholders' proportionate rights to dividends, assets
on liquidation, or proportionate voting strength when a stock dividend is dis-
tributed by a corporation with more than one type of stock.
28 This is apparent in Tenant v. Epstein, for a cash dividend was immediately declared upon
the newly issued stock, which in effect gave the preferred not only a stock dividend but also a
cash dividend in excess of their limited 7%.
'9 All stock in Illinois corporations must have one vote per share. Ill. Constitution, Art.
XI, §3.
30 Eidman v. Bowman, 58 Ill. 444, 447 (187x); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., i86 N.Y.
285, 78 N.E. io9o (19o6).
3' This suggestion was rejected in Tenant v. Epstein with the following words: "It is strenu-
ously argued that the stock dividend be allowed to stand because, if declared pro rata, it
would effect no change in voting control. While this is true, it very materially effects a more
important right, viz., the right to dividends if and when declared." 356 Il1. at 38.
32 Since the stock dividend was one share for each existing share and all was voting stock,
the actual issue of a change in control was not before the court.
33 A possible but very impractical way to issue a stock dividend in this situation would be to
declare the dividend only on the common stock and offer a proportionate number of shares to
preferred shareholders at value less an amount equal to any value attributable solely to voting
rights. The preferred shareholders would thus be paying for any dividend or asset rights to
which they were not entitled as preferred shareholders but would be getting for nothing the
voting rights to which they were entitled as preferred shareholders. The obvious objection to
such a solution is that it would be nearly impossible to evaluate voting rights.
